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In conclusion
Quite clearly, unless the statute is amended or the
regulations or handbooks are revised, care should be
exercised in handling the conveyance of program crops
to a newly-formed entity if a CCC loan is desired on the
commodity.
FOOTNOTES
1 See generally 7 Harl, Agricultural Law § 53.07
(1995); Harl, Agricultural Law Manual §
7.02[2][c][i] (1995). See also N. Harl, "'Midstream'
Incorporation Considerations," 1 Agric. L. Dig. 177
(1990).
2 See generally, 11 Harl, Agricultural Law, § 90.03[2]
(1995).
3 I.R.C. §§ 351(a), 368(c).
4 Id.
5 See, e.g., Weinberg v. Comm'r, 44 T.C. 233 (1965),
aff'd sub. nom., Commissioner v. Sugar Daddy, Inc.,
386 F.2d 836 (9th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 392 U.S.
929 (1968) (14 separate corporations formed to
receive crop sale proceeds).
6 I.R.C. 482. See., e.g., Rooney v. U.S., 305 F.2d 681
(9th Cir. 1962).
7 See, e.g., Connery v. U.S., 460 F.2d 1130 (3d Cir.
1972) (prepaid advertising).
8 Cf. Rev. Rul. 60-331, 1960-2 C.B. 189.
9 Fanning v. U.S., 568 F. Supp. 823 (E.D. Wash.
1983); Heaton v. U.S., 573 F. Supp. 12 (E.D. Wash.
1983).
10 Ltr. Rul. 8431032, no date given.
11 See 7 C.F.R. §§ 1421.5 (general eligibility
requirements); 1421.4 (eligible producers).
12 See 7 C.F.R. §§ 1421.5, 1421.4.
13 7 C.F.R. § 1421.4(a).
14 Id., § 1421.4(a)(1).
15 7 C.F.R. § 1421.4(b).
16 7 C.F.R. § 1421.30.
17 6-LP, Amend. 1 (1994).
18 Id., p. 3-1.
19 Id., p. 3-17.
20 5-PA (Rev. 10, Amend. 34, p. 9-7.
21 Id.
22 See letter dated February 14, 1995, from Thomas L.
Grau, Acting State Executive Director, Consolidated
Farm Service Agency, to Pete Tallman, Atlantic,
Iowa.
23 Id., p. 9-8.
CASES, REGULATIONS AND STATUTES
by Robert P. Achenbach, Jr.
ADVERSE POSSESSION
EXCLUSIVE POSSESSION .  The parties'
properties were owned by one person who sold the
plaintiff the north 225 acres in 1969. The disputed land
was a strip between the plaintiff's land and a road which
bordered the land sold to the defendant in 1989. The
deed to the defendant included the disputed strip;
however, a fence enclosed the strip with the plaintiff's
property until 1992 when the defendant took down the
fence and put up a fence at the record boundary line on
the plaintiff's side of the disputed strip. The strip
consisted of wild brushy land with little usefulness
except for hunting. The plaintiff presented evidence that
the plaintiff used the land for grazing cattle, repaired the
fence and allowed others to hunt on the property. The
defendant presented evidence that, during any ten year
period, either the defendant or the defendant's
predecessor in interest paid the property taxes for the
strip and allowed others to hunt on the property. The
court held that the burden was on the plaintiff to
demonstrate exclusive possession of the disputed land
because the land was wild and unimproved. The court
held that the defendant's evidence of use was sufficient
to prevent acquisition of the disputed land by the
plaintiff by adverse possession. Cunningham v.
Hughes, 889 S.W.2d 864 (Mo. Ct. App. 1994).
POSSESSION BY COTENANTS. The land in
dispute was once owned by an ancestor of the parties to
the suit. When the ancestor died, the will conveyed the
ranch property to six children. Only one of the children
wanted to continue operating the ranch and obtained
quitclaim deeds from the other five children of their
interests in the ranch. However, the will description of
the ranch omitted 40 acres and the quitclaim deeds from
the heirs also omitted the same 40 acres. Therefore, the
heirs each still owned a sixth of the 40 acres under the
residuary clause of the will. The ranch was later
transferred to a corporation, the plaintiff, but this time
the deed included all of the ranch land. The 40 acre error
was not discovered until the corporation attempted to
sell the land. When the heirs, the defendants, of one of
the original children refused to quitclaim their interests
in the 40 acres, the corporation brought suit to have title
conveyed by adverse possession. Citing Fitchen Bros.
Comm. Co. v. Noyes' Estate 246 P. 773 (Mont. 1926),
the court stated that the rule in Montana was that in
order for possession of a cotenant to be adverse against
another cotenant, the other cotenant must be ousted by
an express act declaring possession to be exclusive by
the possessing cotenant. In this case, the plaintiff failed
to oust the defendants because it appeared that no one
knew that the defendants still had an interest in the
ranch. The plaintiff cited Nicholas v. Cousins, 459 P.2d
970 (Wash. 1969) and City & County of Honolulu v.
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Bennett, 552 P.2d 1380 (Hawaii 1976), for an exception
to the ouster rule that because the parties did not know
about the interests in the 40 acres, the parties could be
considered strangers and the ouster notice rule was not
required. The court held that the plaintiff was charged
with the knowledge of the defendants' interests because
the will and quitclaim deeds descriptions of the property
did not include the 40 acres but when the property was
conveyed to the corporation, the 40 acres was included.
Finally, the court held that the plaintiff corporation did
not possess the land by color of title because the
transferor of land, the original heir, could not create
color of title by transferring land to a corporation owned
by the transferor. Y A Bar Livestock Co. v. Harkness,
887 P.2d 1211 (Mont. 1994).
BANKRUPTCY
    GENERAL   -ALM § 13.03.*
AVOIDABLE LIENS. The debtor was a wholesale
dealer in food products who had purchased but not paid
for dairy and food products from a producer. One month
after the debtor filed for Chapter 11, the producer filed a
beneficiary’s notice of intent under Minn. Stat. § 27.138
to preserve trust assets for the amount owed. The
producer sought recovery of the trust assets from the
bankruptcy estate as not included in bankruptcy estate
property. The court held that the statute did not create a
trust because none of the traditional indicia of a trust
existed, such as (1) a trustee, (2) fiduciary duties, and (3)
restrictions on use of trust assets. Because the statute
created no separate corpus, allowed trust assets to be
commingled with the purchaser’s other assets, and
created no fiduciary duty on the purchaser, no trust
indicia were present. Instead, the court held that the
statute created only a security interest which was
perfected upon filing of the beneficiary’s notice of intent
to preserve trust assets. Because the producer did not file
the notice until after the petition, the security interest
was unperfected and avoidable by the trustee. In
addition, the court noted that the statute allowed the
purchaser to sell the “trust” assets free of the security
interest in several instances; therefore, the trustee as a
bona fide purchaser, took possession of the assets free of
the security interest. On appeal the District Court
reversed. The court discussed the parallels between the
Minnesota law and PACA and held that Minn. Stat. §
27.138 created a trust in favor of the seller, the seller
complied with the requirements for preserving the rights
to the trust corpus and that the trust corpus was not
bankruptcy estate property. On remand the Bankruptcy
Court held that an issue of fact remained as to whether
some of the fruit juice products were covered by the
Minnesota law because the evidence was not clear as to
whether the juices were still perishable after processing.
In re Country Club Market, Inc., 175 B.R. 1011
(Bankr. D. Minn. 1994), on rem. from, 175 B.R. 1005
(D. Minn. 1994), rev'g and rem'g, 162 B.R. 226
(Bankr. D. Minn. 1993).
EXEMPTIONS
HOMESTEAD. The debtor was a widow whose
husband had died in 1984. The debtor continued to live
in the marital residence and claimed a personal
exemption of $7,500 for the homestead and an
exemption for the deceased spouse of $7,500. Under Ill.
Cod. Stat. 5/12-902, the exemption of a deceased spouse
continues for the benefit of the surviving spouse so long
as the surviving spouse continues to live in the
residence. The court held that the plain language of the
statute allowed the debtor to claim both deductions. In
re Rhoades, 176 B.R. 167 (Bankr. C.D. Ill. 1994).
IRA. The debtor was 50 years old, unemployed and
single. The debtor had little exempt property other than
$18,000 in an IRA. The court held that the IRA was
eligible for the pension plan exemption under 14 Me.
Rev. Stat. § 4422 and that the debtor was eligible for the
exemption because the IRA was reasonably necessary
for the debtor's support. In re Bates, 176 B.R. 104
(Bankr. D. Me. 1994).
   FEDERAL TAXATION    -ALM § 13.03[7].*
CLAIMS. The debtor had claimed several items of
personal property as exempt and sought to exclude that
property from attachment of a pre-petition lien filed by
the IRS. The IRS argued that the property was not
exempt as to the lien because I.R.C. § 6334 allows the
exemptions only as to levies to collect taxes and not as
to liens. The Bankruptcy Court held that the distinction
argued by the IRS was unreasonable because it would
create a lien which could not be enforced by levy unless
the debtor converted the property into nonexempt assets.
Therefore, the Bankruptcy Court held that the lien did
not cover the exempt personal property. The District
Court reversed, holding that I.R.C. § 6321 provided for
tax liens to attach to all property without exception. The
appellate court affirmed. In re Voelker, 42 F.3d 1050
(7th Cir. 1994), aff'g, 175 B.R. 989 (W.D. Wis. 1994),
rev'g, 164 B.R. 308 (Bankr. W.D. Wis. 1993).
COMPROMISE OFFERS. The debtors had made
an offer to compromise prior to assessment of back taxes
and the compromise was rejected by the IRS. After the
assessment, IRS alleged that the debtors had made an
oral second offer of compromise and the debtors’
attorney had sent a letter appealing the rejection of the
second offer. The court held that the first offer did not
extend the period for making pre-petition assessments
under Section 507(a)(7)(A)(ii) because it occurred prior
to the assessment, the oral second offer was not a valid
offer because it was not made on IRS forms, and the
appeal of the second rejection did not constitute an offer
for purposes of Section 507. In re Aberl, 175 B.R. 915
(N.D. Ohio 1994), aff'g, 159 B.R. 792 (Bankr. N.D.
Ohio 1993).
DISCHARGE. At issue was the dischargeability of
taxes due more than three years before the filing of the
petition. For the years at issue, the joint filing debtors
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were either late in filing or were forced to file after
failing to file tax returns. The debtors maintained only
poor business records and paid taxes on time only
through taxes withheld from wages. In several of the
filings, incorrect deductions were claimed and income
was omitted. During the years at issue, the debtors had
sufficient funds to pay the taxes due. The court held that
the actions of the debtors indicated a willful attempt to
evade taxes, making the taxes for those years
nondischargeable. In re Binkley, 176 B.R. 260 (Bankr.
M.D. Fla. 1994).
At issue was the dischargeability of taxes due more
than three years before the filing of the petition. For the
years at issue, the debtor failed to filed income tax
returns until contacted by the IRS. The debtor supplied
the IRS with all records and signed the returns prepared
by the IRS. The debtor made $28,000 in payments on the
taxes owed before filing for bankruptcy. The court held
that the mere failure to file tax returns was insufficient
evidence of willful attempt to evade taxes since the
debtor did supply the records, sign the returns and
attempt to make payment. In re Miller, 176 B.R. 266




BRUCELLOSIS. The APHIS has adopted as final
reduction of the designation of Virginia from an
accredited free (suspended) state to a modified
accredited free state. 60 Fed. Reg. 11898 (March 3,
1995).
MIGRANT AGRICULTURAL LABOR-ALM §
3.04.* The plaintiffs were migrant agricultural laborers
who harvested crops for the defendant. The plaintiffs
alleged that the defendant failed to pay the promised
hourly and piece wages, failed to provide promised
return transportation at the end of the harvest, failed to
pay the wages when due, and violated the information
and recordkeeping requirements of the Migrant and
Seasonal Agricultural Workers Protection Act
(MSWAPA or the Act). The Act does not contain any
limitation period for bringing an action for violations of
the Act and the trial court applied the state one year
limitation period for liabilities created by statute, Ariz.
Rev. Stat. § 12-541(3), as applied to the predecessor of
the MSWAPA in Rivera v. Anaya, 726 F.2d 564 (9th
Cir. 1984). The appellate court reversed on several
grounds. First, the court characterized the MSWAPA as
nonuniform, including several types of actions which
would qualify for different limitation periods under state
law; therefore, the plaintiffs' causes of action needed to
be individually characterized for the correct state
limitations period. The court ruled that all of the
plaintiffs' causes of action involved aspects of an
employment contract, even the recordkeeping and
information issues because these issues involved
information about the employment conditions.
Therefore, the state's three year statute of limitations for
contract actions applied. Second, the court ruled that a
one year limitation period was inconsistent with the
MSWAPA because the MSWAPA required employers
to keep records for three years and the seasonal nature of
agriculture would often prevent actions from being
brought within one year of the activities which gave rise
to the causes of action. Finally, the court ruled that the
limitation period for statutorily created actions did not
apply to MSWAPA because MSWAPA did not create
the contract causes of action but merely federalized
them. Barajas v. Bermudez, 43 F.3d 1251 (9th Cir.
1994).
POULTRY PRODUCTS. Under a recently enacted
California statute, Cal. Food & Agric. Code § 26661,
poultry products could only be labeled as “fresh” if the
products had been stored above 25 degrees. Under the
federal Poultry Products Inspection Act (PPIA), 21
U.S.C. §§ 451-470, and USDA regulations, poultry
products may be labeled as fresh if stored between 0 and
40 degrees. The plaintiffs argued that the PPIA
preempted the state statute. The state argued that its
statute only prohibited certain labeling and did not add
any labeling requirement or require a different label than
the federal act. The trial court held that a prohibition was
equal to a requirement and that, because the state law
prohibited a label that the federal law allowed, the state
requirement was in addition to and different from the
federal requirement and was preempted. This portion of
the trial court ruling was affirmed on appeal. The trial
court also held that, because the state labeling
requirement was not severable from the similar
requirements for advertising and other marketing
methods, the state was enjoined from enforcing any of
the statute. The appellate court reversed on this issue,
holding that the labeling requirements were
grammatically and functionally severable from the other
parts of the statute. National Broiler Council v. Voss,
44 F.3d 749 (9th Cir. 1994), rev'g in part and aff'g in
part, 851 F. Supp. 1461 (E.D. Cal. 1994).
WETLANDS. The Army Corps of Engineers, the
EPA, the NRCS, the FWS and National Marine Fisheries
Service have issued proposed guidelines for the
establishment, use and operation of mitigation banks for
providing compensatory mitigation for adverse impacts
to wetlands. 60 Fed. Reg. 12286 (March 6, 1995).
FEDERAL ESTATE AND
GIFT TAX
DISCLAIMERS-ALM § 5.02[6].* The decedent and
surviving spouse were residents of a community
property state and entered into an agreement to treat all
separately owned property as community property. The
agreement provided that on the death of one spouse, the
property would all vest in the surviving spouse. After the
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death of the decedent and on the advice of legal counsel,
the surviving spouse had all property in the name of the
decedent, primarily brokerage accounts, changed to
show the surviving spouse as owner but the surviving
spouse did not accept any of the property or any income
from the property. Within nine months of the decedent's
death the surviving spouse filed a disclaimer of all of the
decedent's interest in community property. The IRS
ruled that under Washington law, community property
could not be disposed of without the consent of both
spouses and a community property agreement was
binding on both parties at the death of one of the parties
and constituted a will substitute. The IRS ruled that the
disclaimer period started at the death of the decedent and
the surviving spouse's disclaimer within nine months of
the decedent's death was timely. The IRS also ruled that
the mere change of title to the surviving spouse of the
accounts was not sufficient to void the disclaimer. Ltr.
Rul. 9507017, Nov. 15, 1994.
GENERATION SKIPPING TRANSFERS-ALM §
5.04[6].* The taxpayer was the beneficiary of an
irrevocable trust established in 1967 by the taxpayer's
parent. The taxpayer was co-trustee with the taxpayer's
daughter and a bank. The taxpayer received all net
income from the trust and had the right to distributions
of corpus for the health and support of the taxpayer;
however, the taxpayer could not participate in
authorizing distributions of corpus. The taxpayer and co-
trustees entered into an agreement to even out
distributions from the trust income based on anticipated
trust income. The remainder interests in the trust passed
to the taxpayer's issue. The IRS ruled that the agreement
would not subject the trust to GSTT because the
agreement did not alter the taxpayer's rights in the trust.
Ltr. Rul. 9506028, Nov. 10, 1994.
The taxpayer was the beneficiary of an irrevocable
trust established in 1950 by the taxpayer's parent. The
taxpayer was co-trustee with the taxpayer's daughter and
a bank. The taxpayer received the greater of all net
income from the trust or $25,000 annually. The taxpayer
had the right to distributions of corpus for the health and
support of the taxpayer; however, the taxpayer could not
participate in authorizing distributions of corpus. The
taxpayer and co-trustees entered into an agreement to
even out distributions from the trust income based on
anticipated trust income. The remainder interests in the
trust passed to the taxpayer's issue. The IRS ruled that
the agreement would not subject the trust to GSTT
because the agreement did not alter the taxpayer's rights
in the trust. Ltr. Rul. 9506029, Nov. 10, 1994.
The taxpayers owned equal shares in an irrevocable
trust established by the taxpayers' parent in 1982. The
trust held shares of common stock with voting rights in
one company. That company had several subsidiaries
and the company decided that it should reorganize under
a holding company. Under the reorganization agreement
subject to court approval, the company would exchange
its stock for an equal number of shares of the holding
company and transfer all of its stock in the subsidiaries
to the holding company. The trust would then hold stock
with equal value and rights in the holding company and
the trust agreement was changed to reflect the new stock
ownership. The IRS ruled that (1) the exchange did not
amount to an exercise or release of a power of
appointment held by the taxpayers; (2) the exchange
would not cause the stock to be included in the
taxpayers' gross estates; (3) the exchange would not
result in any gift; and (4) the exchange would not subject
the trust to GSST. Ltr. Rul. 9507016, Nov. 15, 1994.
TRANSFERS WITH RETAINED INTERESTS-
ALM § 5.02[4].* The decedent had suffered injuries
from complications at birth and the decedent, through
the decedent's parents, sued the hospital and doctors for
malpractice. The parties reached various settlements
which provided lump sum payments and annual
payments. The decedent's parents (the ruling is not clear
when the decedent died) obtained approval from the
probate court to establish two trusts to receive the
decedent's settlement proceeds. The trusts provided for
the decedent to receive until age 18 trust net income
necessary for the decedent's health, education and
support with the trust corpus to be distributed to the
decedent at age 18. The remainder was to pass as
appointed by the decedent, or, upon failure of the
decedent to appoint trust corpus, to the decedent's heirs.
The IRS ruled that the settlement proceeds were the
decedent's property because the law suits were personal
to the decedent; therefore, the trust property was the
decedent's property and was includible in the decedent's
estate because the decedent retained the power to alter
the disposition of the trust property. Ltr. Rul. 9506004,
Nov. 1, 1994.
VALUATION. The taxpayer transferred a mineral
interest in property to a ten-year trust for the taxpayer’s
children. The trust provided for distribution of income
reduced by a 15 percent depletion reserve. The trustees
had the power to sell or dispose of trust property and
reinvest in other productive property. The taxpayer filed
a gift tax return and valued the gift by first reducing the
fair market value by the 15 percent depletion reserve and
then valuing the income interest using Table B of Treas.
Reg. § 25.2512-5(f). The taxpayer argued that the use of
the table was appropriate because the trustees had the
power to sell the depleting asset and reinvest in
nondepleting assets. The court held that the value of the
interest was to be decreased by the 15 percent depletion
reserve but no further reduction in value could be made
because the asset would be depleted before the
termination of the trust. The court pointed out that the
taxpayer provided no indication of any intention by the
trustees to sell the trust property. The appellate
affirmation was designated as not for publication and has
limited precedential value. Froh v. Comm’r, 95-1 U.S.
Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶ 60,189 (9th Cir. 1995), aff'g, 100
T.C. 1 (1993).
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FEDERAL INCOME
TAXATION
BAD DEBTS-ALM § 4.03[7].* The debtor was a
bankruptcy estate for a business debtor. The owner of
the business had made several "loans" to another
company in an attempt to keep that company operating
so as to provide business for the debtor company. The
other company eventually failed and the estate claimed
the loss of the "loaned" money as a business bad debt
deduction. The debtor company had listed the "loaned"
funds as a capital investment on a credit application and
the other company had listed the "loaned" funds" as
capital investment on credit applications and account
statements. The court held that the estate was not entitled
to a bad debt deduction for the amounts contributed to
the other company because the parties treated the funds
as a capital contribution and did not issue any evidence
of a loan, such as a maturity date, interest or repayment
schedules. The decision is designated as not for
publication and has limited precedential effect. In re
Duffy, 95-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶ 50,110 (Bankr.
E.D. Calif. 1994).
C CORPORATIONS-ALM § 7.02.*
LIQUIDATION. The taxpayer was a corporation
which liquidated during negotiations concerning a failed
attempt to purchase another business. The court held that
the settlement amount received after the liquidation was
not taxable to the corporation because the corporation
liquidated before the settlement was reached and there
was no evidence that the negotiations were delayed to
avoid the taxes. Beauty Acquisition Corp. v. Comm'r,
T.C. Memo. 1995-87.
DISASTER AREAS-ALM § 4.05[2].* The IRS has
announced the disaster areas designated by the President
for 1994 for purposes of eligibility of taxpayers to
qualify for I.R.C. § 165(i) deferral of claiming losses
from those disasters. Rev. Rul. 95-17, I.R.B. 1995-9, 4.
DISCHARGE OF INDEBTEDNESS-ALM §
4.02[15].* The taxpayer owned a portion of a family
business which owned a profit-sharing trust of which the
taxpayer was an administrator and co-trustee. The
taxpayer had borrowed from the trust and the debt was
discharged when the trust was terminated. The court
held that the taxpayer could not exclude the debt from
income because the taxpayer was not insolvent. In
addition, the debt was not considered a discharge but a
distribution because the debt was still collectible, either
from the taxpayer's liability as a fiduciary of the trust or
from the taxpayer's vested interest in the trust. Caton v.
Comm'r, T.C. Memo. 1995-80.
FUEL TAX CREDIT. The taxpayer used sawdust to
produce a gas used to fire boilers which produced steam
used in a process upgrading ethanol for use in gasoline.
The taxpayer claimed a fuel tax credit for a portion of
the cost of the ethanol because the sawdust was used in
the ethanol enhancement process. The court held that the
fuel tax credit was available only if the fuel produced
from a biomass was sold to third parties. The court held
that the fuel produced by the sawdust was not sold to
third parties but was only used by the taxpayers to make
other fuel which was sold to third parties; therefore, the
taxpayer was not eligible for the credit. United States v.
King, 95-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶ 50,091 (4th Cir.
1995), aff'g, 94-1 U.S. Tax. Cas. (CCH) ¶ 50,013 (D.
Va. 1994).
INVESTMENT TAX CREDIT-ALM § 4.04.* The
taxpayer agreed to construct a facility to burn a city's
solid waste to generate electricity. The facility was
operational in 1984 but the facility did not produce as
much electricity as planned and the taxpayer's business
eventually failed. The IRS argued, and the Tax Court
held, that the facility was not eligible for the biomass
energy tax credit, investment tax credit or depreciation
because the facility was never "placed in service" since
the facility did not generate the amount of electricity
intended. The appellate court reversed, holding that the
facility was eligible for the credits and depreciation
because the facility was fully operational since it had the
necessary permits, was under the possession and control
of the taxpayer and was running on a regular basis.
Sealy Power, Ltd. v. Comm'r, 95-1 U.S. Tax Cas.
(CCH) ¶ 50,103 (5th Cir. 1995), rev'g, T.C. Memo.
1992-168.
The taxpayers were employed in various professions
and invested in a solar energy equipment leasing
program. The program was run by the investment
promoters and did not involve any participation by the
taxpayers. The court held that the taxpayers were not
entitled to investment tax credit, depreciation and energy
tax credits from the investments because the leasing
transactions were shams since the taxpayers had no
intention of making a profit from the investments, did
not participate in the business and the lessees retained
any appreciation on the equipment. In addition, the
promoters were not experienced at solar energy
equipment leasing and were primarily tax specialists,
indicating that the program was tax motivated. Johnson
et al. v. U.S., 95-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶ 50,109 (Fed.
Cls. 1995).
INVOLUNTARY EXCHANGES-ALM §
4.02[16].* The taxpayer's residence and contents were
destroyed in a Presidentially declared disaster. The
taxpayer received $35x in insurance proceeds for
unscheduled insured personal property. The taxpayer
received $10x for separately scheduled personal property
and $300x for the loss of the residence. The taxpayer
constructed a new residence for $300x and purchased
one painting for $10x which was separately scheduled
for insurance.  The IRS ruled that no gain or loss was
recognized from the loss and repurchase of unscheduled
property and that because the taxpayer spent more to
replace the residence and separately scheduled property
than was received in insurance proceeds, no gain or loss
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would be recognized from those transactions. Rev. Rul.
95-22, I.R.B. 1995-12.
NET OPERATING LOSSES. In 1977 and 1978,
the debtor filed federal income tax returns which showed
net operating losses (NOLs). The returns carried the
statement that the NOLs were elected to be carried
forward under I.R.C. § 56(b)(3)(C); however, this
section did not provide for any election to carry net
operating losses forward. The IRS argued that the
returns were sufficient to bar any carryback of the
NOLs. The court held that the election was insufficient
to waive the right to carry the NOLs back because the
statement had the wrong statute listed. Powers v.
Comm'r, 95-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶ 50,086 (5th Cir.
1995), rev'g, T.C. Memo. 1986-494.
PASSIVE ACTIVITY LOSSES-ALM § 4.05[3].*
The taxpayer had excess passive activity losses in 1986
and sought to carry back the excess losses to 1984 and
1985 tax years. The court disallowed the carrybacks
because, under 1986 law, passive activity losses could
only be carried forward. Adler v. U.S., 95-1 U.S. Tax
Cas. (CCH) ¶ 50,098 (Fed. Cls. 1995).
PENSION PLANS. For plans beginning in February
1995, the weighted average is 7.29 percent with the
permissible range of 6.56 to 7.95 percent (90 to 109
percent permissable range) and 6.56 to 8.02 percent (90
to 110  percent permissable range) for purposes of
determining the full funding limitation under I.R.C. §
412(c)(7).  Notice 95-9, I.R.B. 1995-10, 10.
S  CORPORATIONS-ALM § 7.02[3][c].*
TRUSTS. The decedent established a revocable
intervivos trust and funded the trust with S corporation
stock. At the death of the decedent, the trust was divided
into two trusts. One of these trusts provided that all net
income was to be paid to the beneficiary at least
quarterly and the trustees had the discretion to distribute
trust corpus if necessary for the beneficiary's education,
health or support. At the death of the beneficiary, the
trust was to be split into several trusts, one for each
grandchild of the decedent, with each beneficiary
receiving net income at least quarterly. The beneficiary
had the right to one third of trust corpus at ages 25, 30
and 35, with any remainder held by the beneficiary's
heirs. The IRS ruled that the trusts would qualify as
QSSTs if the appropriate elections are filed. Ltr. Rul.
9506011, Nov. 3, 1994.
NEGLIGENCE
EMPLOYER LIABILITY. The plaintiff worked as
a ranch hand for the defendants. One week before the
plaintiff's work related injury, the plaintiff injured his
back while helping the defendant start an airplane, a
non-work related activity. The plaintiff was injured
during a "working" of some calves. Because of the
plaintiff's back injury, the plaintiff was given the lightest
work, branding, vaccinating and castrating the calves.
After doing this work on one calf, the plaintiff had to
turn and jump away when the calf was released and
further injured his back. The plaintiff alleged that the
defendants had negligently failed to (1) provide a
reasonably safe workplace, (2) properly supervise the
branding operation, (3) provide adequate instructions,
(4) allow the plaintiff to step clear of the branding area
before the calf was released, (5) warn the plaintiff that
the calf was to be released, (6) instruct the plaintiff about
alternative methods of branding, (7) provide a suitable
number of employees to perform the branding, (8) assist
the plaintiff in performing the branding, and (9) refrain
from using the plaintiff because of the prior back injury.
The plaintiff testified at a deposition that the branding
was properly done and the plaintiff was familiar with the
process because he had performed brandings with the
same crew twice before. The plaintiff also testified that
he felt he could easily avoid released calves and that he
did not think he would injure his back in attempting to
avoid a calf. The plaintiff also acknowledged that
everyone was fully instructed and informed about the
branding process. The court held that the trial court had
properly granted summary judgment for the defendants
because the plaintiff had not demonstrated any issue of
fact as to the defendants' negligence. Satterlee v.
Johnson, 526 N.W.2d 256 (S.D. 1995).
STATE REGULATION OF
AGRICULTURE
RACEHORSE BREEDING. Under Ohio Rev.
Code §§ 3769.082(D), 3769.085 and Ohio Admin. Code
§ 3769-15-34, only standardbred horses born to stallions
which stood for breeding in Ohio during the "entire
breeding season" of the year in which the colt was sired
could be raced in Ohio. The breeding season for horses
in the United States is from mid-February through July.
The plaintiff wanted to "double-breed" its mares by
sending them to Australia for the November through
January breeding season there. The defendant racing
commission argued that such double breeding was
barred by the statute and administrative regulations. The
court held that an interpretation of "breeding season" as
including only the February through July period was
consistent with the purpose of the act to protect the Ohio
breeding business by preventing horses bred in other
states from racing in Ohio. In addition, the widespread
practice of breeding standardbred horses in the United
States during that period indicated that the legislature
followed that practice in choosing the term "breeding
season" instead of using a term such as "breeding year."
Pickwick Farms v. Ohio State Racing Comm., 644






AGRICULTURAL PRESERVATION . An
individual had applied to the county zoning commission
for approval to build a non-resource dwelling in a area
zoned for agricultural use only. The plaintiff appealed to
the land use board the county's decision to grant the
application and the land use board affirmed the county's
decision by pointing to an exception in the zoning
ordinance that allowed nonagricultural construction in
areas where agricultural use is impracticable. However,
the land use board did not refer to any evidence that
agricultural use was impracticable. The defendant
responded that the applicant's attorney testified as to the
exception, but the court held that such evidence was not
sufficient to support the land use board's ruling. In
addition, the court ruled that the land use board's ruling
was deficient because it did not clearly identify the
parameters of the claimed exception so that any
evidence, if there had been any, could be reviewed
under the standards of the exception. The respondent
also argued that the land use board had given an
alternate finding that the zoning ordinance allowed
nonagricultural construction so long as any remaining
land remain in agricultural use. The court held that this
so-called exception would completely nullify any
zoning restriction because it effectively required
agricultural use only in areas not used for other
purposes. The case was remanded to the land use board
for proceedings to obtain evidence and to identify the
exception relied upon by the board. Reeves v. Yamhill
County, 888 P.2d 79 (Or. Ct. App. 1995).
AGRICULTURAL LAW MANUAL
by Neil E. Harl
This comprehensive, annotated looseleaf manual is
an ideal deskbook for attorneys, tax consultants, lenders
and other professionals who advise agricultural clients.
The book contains over 900 pages and an index.
As a special offer to Digest subscribers, the Manual
is offered to new subscribers at $115, including at no
extra charge updates published within five months
after purchase. Updates are published every four
months to keep the Manual current with the latest
developments. After the first free update, additional
updates will be billed at $35 each in 1995.
For your copy, send a check for $115 (WI residents
add $5.75 sales tax) to Agricultural Law Press, P.O. Box
5444, Madison, WI 53705.
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